Tathāgata Substituted for Self? Part I

The Buddha is portrayed in the Pali Canon as eschewing metaphysical discussions. One such metaphysical question the Buddha refused to answer was the question on the state of a tathāgata after death. The following stock phrase or pericope is used in many suttas:

Does the Tathāgata exist after death?
Does the Tathāgata not exist after death?
Does the Tathāgata both exist and not exist after death?
Does the Tathāgata a neither exist nor not exist after death?

The word tathāgata is an epithet for the Buddha. Its most common usage is by the Buddha who uses the word to refer to himself in third person. Its exact meaning has been debated by scholars, but there is general agreement that the word is used to designate an enlightened or awakened being.

Curiously, there is no evidence to suggest that the word tathāgata was wildly used by non-Buddhist groups during the Buddha’s time. The word tathāgata is hardly found at all in the non-Buddhist Indian literature, and in the few places in the Jain sutras where it is used to explicitly refer to an enlightened being, the Prakrit word tahāgaya is used instead which may not even originate from the same etymological root.

Another interesting fact is that none of the speculative views concerning the tathāgata after death is mentioning among the 62 wrong views in the Brahmajāla Sutta. These 62 wrong views are portrayed in the sutta as being an exhaustive categorization of all speculative views during the Buddha’s time.

To be fair, there is one instance of the tathāgata after death pericope in the Brahmajāla Sutta, but the usage is not tallied as one of the 62 wrong views but instead is used in an off-hand way to illustrative how the eel-wigglers respond to such metaphysical questions. In the Chinese version of the Brahmajāla Sutta the pericope is not present at all.

While there is no doubt that the Brahmajāla Sutta has been formulized and obtained various accretions, the antiquity of the sutta is well attested by the fact of it being mentioned in the first Buddhist council and being separately translated into Chinese prior to the creation of the Chinese Dirgha Agama. It being placed first in the Pali Canon is further testament to its high reputation among the early Buddhists (Pande 81).

While the Brahmajāla Sutta does not mention as one of its wrong views the tathāgata’s state after death, it does, however, enumerate a total of 24 different views on the subject of life after death (16 for some sort of continuation after death with 8 views denying any continuation). This high number (around a quarter) of views in regards to the question of life after death indicates that this was an important and often discussed religious issue in the Buddha’s time.

This is not really surprising given that all the religious traditions in the world have at some point debated such questions and India was no exception in this regard.

But if the issue of life after death was such a hot issue of debate during the Buddha’s day, why do we find the stock passage of what happens to an enlightened being after death instead of what happens to an individual (regardless of spiritual attainment) after death like the views expressed in the Brahmajāla Sutta?

It just seems incredulous that all the religious seekers of the day were only concerned about a subset of a select few beings (enlightened ones) rather than the general set of human beings.

One possible solution to these difficulties is that the suttas originally did contain passages on life after death of a being in general but was systematically changed later to an enlightened being.

At first glance this may seem a rather remote and dubious proposition, but I will show in following essays that there is strong evidence that this indeed occur.

References

Pande, Govind Chandra. Fourth Revised Edition, 1995. Studies in the Origins of Buddhism. (Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass : 2006).

Intrusive Interpolations in the Potthapada Sutta -- Part II

In part 1, I argued that there were interpolations made to the Potthapada Sutta as the result of systemization. In this second part, I will continue to build upon my argument by demonstrating that the concluding sections of the sutta exhibit the same problems of interpolations which result in obscuring the main purport of the text.

In the second half of the sutta the Buddha talks about the realities of the perceived self or atta-patilabha to a wanderer named Potthapada.

After the Buddha describes to Potthapada the wanderer that his soteriological goal is to abandon the acquired self, he asks Potthapada a series of questions:

Suppose they were to ask you: 'Did you exist in the past? Did you not not exist? Will you exist in the future? Will you not not exist? Do you exist now? Do you not not exist?' Thus asked, how would you answer?

Potthapada replies that he would say, “I existed in the past. I did not not exist. I will exist in the future. I will not not exist. I exist now. I do not not exist.”

Here the Buddha is asking a direct question on Potthapada’s perceived existence over time. There is no talk of past lives, and when the Buddha is asking Potthapada whether he “exist[ed] in the past,” it can only be construed that the Buddha is inquiring into the life that Potthapada can perceive here and now.

Hearing the wanderer’s answers, the Buddha continues:

Suppose, Citta, they were to ask you: 'Whatever your past acquisition of a self: Is that alone your true acquisition of self, while the future & present ones are null & void? Whatever your future acquisition of a self: Is that alone your true acquisition of a self, while the past & present ones are null & void? Whatever your present acquisition of a self: Is that alone your true acquisition of a self, while the past & future ones are null & void?' Thus asked, how would you answer?

...Thus asked, lord, I would answer: 'Whatever my past acquisition of a self: on that occasion, that alone was my true acquisition of a self, while future & present ones were null & void. Whatever my future acquisition of a self: on that occasion, that alone will be my true acquisition of a self, while the past & present ones will be null & void. Whatever my present acquisition of a self: on that occasion, that alone is my true acquisition of a self, while the past & future ones are null & void.'

It is important to note here that the only difference between this question and the previous one is the Buddha's elaboration of the "I" into the “true acquisition of a self.” The Buddha is doing this in an effort to help Potthapada to draw a connection between the "I" and the "acquired self" in order to shift the understanding of the “I” from a presupposed thing to an acquired concept.

The key here is that these passages have nothing to do with establishing the reality of an ontological self. On the contrary, the passages seem to move in the opposite direction by implying that the “I” is not something someone has but mentally acquires.

In an abrupt shift, the sutta continues with Buddha expounding an ontological view of the self that startlingly resembles the Upanishad's:

In the same way, Citta, when there is a gross acquisition of a self... it's classified just as a gross acquisition of a self. When there is a mind-made acquisition of a self... When there is a formless acquisition of a self, it's not classified either as a gross acquisition of a self or as a mind-made acquisition of a self. It's classified just as a formless acquisition of a self.

Just as when milk comes from a cow, curds from milk, butter from curds, ghee from butter, and the skimmings of ghee from ghee. When there is milk, it's not classified as curds, butter, ghee, or skimmings of ghee. It's classified just as milk. When there are curds... When there is butter... When there is ghee... When there are the skimmings of ghee, they're not classified as milk, curds, butter, or ghee. They're classified just as the skimmings of ghee.

The passage appears to convey the idea that once you have acquired one of the three selfs, for example, the gross self of the body, that acquired self will persist as long as one can maintain it. Once that particular self changes to another type, for example, a gross self changing into a formless self (presumably after death), nothing is left behind from what it was before. While the self’s overall form may change, like milk changing into butter, the underlying essence that keeps the self together still persists (butter is still milk but simply has a different appearance and consistency).

What is amazing about this passage is that the Buddha seems to be conveying a Vedic view of the self which blatantly contradicts the Buddha’s notion of anatta or not-self.

Interestingly the sutta continues with the Buddha concluding, “Citta, these are the world's designations, the world's expressions, the world's ways of speaking, the world's descriptions, with which the Tathagata expresses himself but without grasping to them.”

Even though in the very last passage the Buddha is depicted as presenting a Vedic notion of the self, we are summarily reminded that the Buddha’s mentioning of the self is just a worldly expression that is used to express an idea and by no means used to designate an actual underlying reality.

What is going on here?

Before answering this question, it is important to reexamine the milk simile which seems to be the core element of the Buddha’s argument. The first thing that is interesting about this simile is that it refers to a total of five different states (milk, curds, butter, ghee, skimmings of ghee) yet there are only three different types of acquired selfs (gross, mind and formless). The second issue with the simile is that there is a fundamental difference between milk transition states and self transition states. In the case of milk, once a state has transitioned into another state there can be no reversal to the previous one, for example, ghee cannot be turned back into butter. However, with the three different kinds of self, this is not the case. It is quite easy to see, for example, the gross self transitioning into a mind made self which can transition back to the gross self.

What is suspicious about the Buddha alluding to the gross self, mind-made self and the formless self as being merely “world’s expressions” or conventional forms of speech is that no one in ancient India referred to themselves via these three different types of selves as if they were common expressions that everyone immediately knew what one was referring to.

The central problem behind all these interpretive issues stems from the idea of an ontological notion of the self as a “thing” that is acquired. If we can for the moment understand the self as a conventional conceptual entity a person is attributed with or acquires, and look at these passages from this perspective, we find that all the issues raised suddenly dissipate.

For example, if we look at the milk simile and understand the various different maturation stages of milk as being analogous to the different maturation stages of individual (baby, boy/girl, adolescent, man/woman, old man/old woman) everything makes sense. Like milk that transitions irreversibly from one stage to the next so does an individual.

What more, the usage of the terms baby, boy, adolescent, man and so on are conventional terms unlike the three selfs.

Understanding the simile in this way makes the central point a lot more transparent. The chief idea being is that the various stages are just expressions that capture a particular stage of a process that is continually changing through time. The fact that we use such terms does in no way indicate an underlying essential entity. What one may mistake as a concrete permanent entity is simply a process of change that we habitually abstract and reify an ontological concept out of.

Conclusion

The Potthapada Sutta is a profound sutta which demonstrates the Buddha’s view on the self. Through interpolations linked with scholarly systemization, the central purport of the sutta has unfortunately been obscured. By interpreting the key passages from the perspective of the conceptual self in this life instead of three types of selves in subsequent future lives, it becomes clear that the Buddha is expounding the notion of anatta and not an explanation of the continuity of a life through rebirth as the common traditional interpretations have posited.

Intrusive Interpolations In the Potthapada Sutta -- Part I

The Potthapada Sutta from the Digha Nikaya is an interesting one. The sutta contains two conversations between the Buddha and the wanderer Potthapada on two separate occasions. The first conversation begins with Potthapada asking the Buddha on what is the “ultimate cessation of perception” followed by further questioning by Potthapada on various speculative questions on the nature of the soul, whether it exists after death and so on. The Buddha declines to answer these last series of questions positing that he does so because it is not conducive towards enlightenment. The first conversation ends with the Buddha leaving and Potthapada’s admitting that he doesn’t fully understand why the Buddha declined to the answer the speculative questions asked of him.

A couple of days later, Potthapada seeks out the Buddha and asks him to clarify why the Buddha did not answer the speculative questions previously asked. The Buddha goes on to repeat that such questions he declares as uncertain because they are not conducive towards enlightenment.

The Buddha goes on to say that there are ascetics who proclaim that, "After death, the self is exclusively happy and free from disease” and when questioned on this statement, none of them could offer a means to achieve this end and none of them could say they experienced what they proclaimed. In a famous simile the Buddha says:

Potthapada, it's as if a man were to say, 'I'm in love with the most beautiful woman in this country,' and other people were to say to him, 'Well, my good man, this most beautiful woman in this country with whom you are in love: do you know if she's of the warrior caste, the priestly caste, the merchant caste, or the laborer caste?' and, when asked this, he would say, 'No.' Then they would say to him, 'Well then, do you know her name or clan name? Whether she's tall, short, or of medium height? Whether she's dark, fair, or ruddy-skinned? Do you know what village or town or city she's from?' When asked this, he would say, 'No.' Then they would say to him, 'So you've never known or seen the woman you're in love with?' When asked this, he would say, 'Yes.'

The Buddha provides another simile and continues by saying, “Potthapada, there are these three acquisitions of a self (atta-patilabha): the gross acquisition of a self, the mind-made acquisition of a self, and the formless acquisition of a self.”

What is interesting about this passage is that the self is listed as possessing three different categories or types. This list oriented analytical style appears to be a scholastic elaboration performed by the systemizers hinting at the passage possibly being inauthentic.

Another interesting feature of this passage is the usage of the Pali compound word atta-patilabha which is translated, in this passage at least, as “acquisition of a self.” In the Pali English Dictionary the verb, paṭilabhati is defined as to obtain, receive and is derived from the verb root labh- (to get) with the prefix pati- (on to, at). From this, we get a sense of the word atta-patilabha as an acquired or obtained self.

I think the Buddha specifically used such a term to indicate that our notion of self is not intrinsic to man (remember the Buddha’s anatta or not-self) but something that is necessarily constructed or “acquired” through convention, beliefs and so on. The Buddha’s emphasis by using the word atta-paṭilabha seems to center here on human psychology instead of ontology as the list of three different kinds of selves seems to suggest.

If we take this list of different acquired selves and broach the question of how one may acquire such selves we soon run into difficulties. For example, how can one who already has a gross self (as defined by the Buddha in the next couple of sentences as the four great elements or the body) acquire another gross self if he or she already has one? Of course, one can say you can "acquire" a gross self by being reborn, but why use the word paṭilabha (acquired) in the first place? Why not just say there are three types of selves (gross, mind-made and formless) and leave it at that?

Following this rather problematic passage, the Buddha continues on to say:

I teach the Dhamma for the abandoning of the gross acquisition of a self, such that, when you practice it, defiling mental qualities will be abandoned, bright mental qualities will grow, and you will enter & remain in the culmination & abundance of discernment, having known & realized it for yourself in the here & now.

It appears fairly clear that the Buddha is saying that one can get rid of the “gross acquisition of a self” by “abandoning . . . defiling mental qualities.” At first glance it seems reasonable. But when you reread the statement it almost sounds like with the abandonment of defiling mental qualities the body itself become abandoned which seems to suggest it disappears or immediately breaks down.

If instead we substitute the “gross” acquisition of a self with just the “acquired self”, which I indicated is a purely mental construct, then this passage makes a lot more sense. As our sense of who and what we are is based on our mental apparatus, it seems logical that when we can abandon the “mental qualities” emanating from this mental apparatus the whole notion of a self is necessarily abandoned as well.

In part II, I will continue my analysis of the sutta and show that one of most famous similes in the Pali canon has been obscured further suggesting that this sutta has suffered from interpolations.

Pericope Problems in the Mahakammavibhanga Sutta - Part 2

In part 1, I examined the Mahakammavibhanga Sutta pointing out some evidence for interpolations and argued that that the same conclusion could still be made, and even clarified, if the interpolations were removed.

My strongest argument for the text being tampered with is located in the concluding passages where the Buddha spells out the main point to be drawn from the sutta:

As to the person here who kills living beings . . . and on the dissolution of the body, after death, reappears in a state of deprivation . . . even in hell: either earlier he did an evil action to be felt as painful, or later he did an evil action to be felt as painful. . . .

As to the person here who kills living beings . . . and on the dissolution of the body, after death, reappears in a happy destination . . . in the heavenly world: either earlier he did a good action to be felt as pleasant, or later he did an action to be felt as pleasant . . .

As to the person here who abstains from living beings . . . and on the dissolution of the body, after death, reappears in a happy destination . . . in the heavenly world: either earlier he did a good action to be felt as pleasant, or later he did an action to be felt as pleasant . . .

As to the person here who abstains from living beings . . . and on the dissolution of the body, after death, reappears in a state of deprivation . . . even in hell: either earlier he did an evil action to be felt as painful, or later he did an evil action to be felt as painful.

The difficulty with these passages lies with the mixing of psychological processes with metaphysical ones. The juxtaposition of two distinctly disparate processes together in an effort to suggest they are somehow related leaves a rather contrived feeling; it almost seems that the author is trying to force two things together that simply do not belong together.

It is essential to note that at the beginning of the sutta the Buddha gave a brief, concise exposition on kamma conveying that the fruits of an intentional action lead to either pleasant, unpleasant, or neither pleasant or unpleasant feelings. The passages quoted above appear to be a continuation of this initial mentioning, but the link between the two is not as clear with the various metaphysical pericopes or stock passages interspersed amongst the core textual element of kamma and the resultant feeling.

If we take these concluding passages at face value the basic import seems to be that any intentional action which produces a certain feeling will lead to a particular post mortem existence. For example, if we commit “an evil action to be felt as painful”, we will end up in hell.

But this is problematic. What happens to one who commits an evil action to be felt as pleasurable and not painful (for example, putting cocaine in someone’s drink)? Do we still go to hell or do we go to heaven? In a similar case, what happens if we commit a good action to be felt as painful (violently pushing a person aside so they do not get hit by a moving vehicle), does that mean we will end up in hell?

Another issue is the fact that a person will commit thousands if not hundreds of thousands of intentional actions over the course of a lifetime that could be described as causing pleasurable or painful feelings. So which of these actions determine our post mortem destiny? All of them? Only the worst ones? The actions that have the most prevalence? Do we go to hell or heaven equal to number of times we experience pleasant or unpleasant feelings? Or do we only go once? But which one, heaven or hell, or both?

As argued in part one, we can go ahead and remove these stock passages (and add a few logical substitutions based on the Buddha’s first succinct exposition of kamma in the intial part of the sutta) and still reach the same overall conclusion of the text:

As to the person who did an evil action and feels pain: either earlier he did an evil action to be felt as painful, or later he did an evil action to be felt as painful. . . .

As to the person here who did an evil action and feels pleasure: either earlier he did a good action to be felt as pleasant, or later he did a good action to be felt as pleasant . . .

As to the person here who did a good action and feels pleasure: either earlier he did a good action to be felt as pleasant . . .

As to the person here who did a good action and feels pleasure: either earlier he did an evil action to be felt as painful, or later he did an evil action to be felt as painful.

Notice that this constructed passage is now a lot clearer and also follows logically from the Buddha’s initial exposition that solely described a psychological process. The difficulties I described above are for a large part now gone.

Conclusion

The Buddha took the Vedic notion of kamma and gave it a psychological and ethical dimension to it. This was a revolutionary innovation which was more subtle than the prevailing notions of karma at the time.

The Mahakammavibhanga Sutta is a sutta that I believe originally delved deeper into the psychological aspect of kamma and not the cosmological aspect in an effort to remind the reader to be careful about drawing conclusions about kamma and thus moral causality when examining instances where one lacks the capability of obtaining all the necessary information. While the cosmological aspect per se does not detract from this conclusion, it obscures rather than clarifies.

Pericope Problems in the Mahakammavibhanga Sutta - Part 1

The second part of the excellent article, “Kamma in Context: The Mahakammavibhangasutta and the Culakammavibhangasutta”, comments on the philosophical imports of the Mahakammavibhangasutta.

The first part of the sutta begins the Buddha admonishing a monk for not properly answering a wandering ascetic who enquires into the different kinds of feelings one experiences for an intentional act of body, speech or mind:

This misguided man Samiddhi would have answered the wanderer rightly when asked about the three kinds of feelings 'Friend, Potaliputta, having done an intentional kamma by way of body, speech and mind [whose result is] to be felt as pleasant, one feels pleasure. Having done an intentional action by way of body, speech or mind [whose result is] to be felt as painful, one feels pain. Having done an intentional action by way of body, speech or mind [whose result is] to be felt as neither-pain-nor-pleasure, one feels neither-pain-nor-pleasure.'

This short and concise statement is revealing of the Buddha’s notion of kamma. For one thing, this statement indicates the importance the Buddha places on the psychological aspect of karma. Here he mentions how particular feelings result from certain intentional actions or kamma. It is important to note that there is no mention of future rebirths or any other metaphysical notions associated with cosmology.

Then an odd shift occurs and the Buddha starts his analysis of the “great exposition of action” by outlining four types of people who end up in heaven and hell: (1) Those who live unethical lives are born in hellish destinations (2) those who live unethical lives are reborn in heavenly destinations (3) those who live ethical lives are reborn in heavenly destinations (4) those who live ethical lives are reborn in hellish destinations.

He then goes on to relate how various religious men arrive at different ethical conclusions based on the perceived fate of people after death: (1) There are evil actions with negative results (2) There are no evil actions that have negative results (3) There are good actions that results in positive results (4) There are no good actions that result in positive results.

Interestingly, the Buddha mentions that one of the primary methods used to reach such conclusions is based on supernormal powers:

By means of ardor, endeavor, devotion, diligence and right attention, some recluse or brahmin attains such concentration of mind that, when his mind is concentrated, he sees with the divine eye, which is purified and surpasses the human, he sees . . .

What is interesting about this particular means of gaining knowledge is the primacy it is given in the text. While there does appear to be some evidence that there were other teachers in ancient India who did make various claims based on supra-normal insight, such insights are always associated with arguing for moral causality and never against it.

But this is exactly what we have:

By means of ardor . . . some recluse or brahmin . . . sees with the divine eye . . . sees that person here who abstains from killing living beings . . . after death, he reappears in the state of deprivation, in an unhappy destination, even in hell. He says thus: ‘Indeed, there are no good actions; there is no result of good conduct.’

The only religious school of the Buddha’s time who appeared to deny the result of moral conduct came from the Lokayata school. However, this school had a very materialistic view of the world and considered that the only valid means of knowledge was from the five senses. They would have probably denied the possibility of any such knowledge gained from the “divine eye.”

This red flag alerts us that this part of the text may not be original. Besides changing tone from a psychological one to a cosmological one, the definite scholastic systemization, that cannot be denied, all point to the fact of a possible later addition.

The article mentioned above does not even notice these difficulties and continues to take the sutta at face value which only makes author's main argument more difficult to make.

The main conclusion he comes to is based on the last series of passages in the text. In these passages the Buddha concludes that there is indeed moral causation and further elucidates the functioning of kamma:

As to the person here who kills living beings. . . and holds wrong view, and on the dissolution of the body, after death, reappears in a state of deprivation . . . even in hell: either earlier he did an evil action to be felt as painful, or later he did an evil action to be felt as painful, or at the time of death he acquired and undertook wrong view. . . . And since he here killed living beings . . . and held wrong view, he will experience the result of that either here and now, or in his next rebirth, or in some subsequent existence.

This passage is then repeated three times with the permutations of evil/good actions leading to heaven/hell.

The author then summarizes the meaning of this passage by noting, "This is the key message: do not be fooled by your own (limited) knowledge of events; do not let that undermine trust in the metaphysical principle, which is continually at work, although sometimes (perhaps often) not apparent."

In the basic outline of his conclusion, I agree with him. However, if he is referring to the “metaphysical principle” in terms of the cosmological kamma/rebirth passages then I disagree. In the next part, I will provide further evidence of rebirth interpolations and the show that the text makes the same important point in an even clearer fashion without them.

Revisiting the Culakammavibhanga Sutta -- Part 2

In the excellent article, “Kamma in Context: The Mahakammavibhangasuta and the Culakammavibhangasutta”, the author comments on the Culakammavibhanga sutta making some important points.

In the sutta, the Buddha replies to a Brahmin student who asks the Buddha the reason behind the differences in human beings in regards to length of life, health, beauty, wealth and so on. The Buddha replies by saying that it is a person’s ethical actions and not sacrificial actions which cause these differences.

As the author in the article states:

The cause of beauty, wealth, good health, a good and happy worldly life, according to the Buddha, is the moral quality of one’s individual behavior. And the antecedent of one’s moral behavior is the moral nature of one’s mind. This is the real point the Buddha is making.

While this goes a long way to help penetrate the meaning within the text, we are still left with some difficulties.

As remarked in part 1, the Culakammavibhanga Sutta is rife with repeated rebirth pericopes (on the dissolution of the body, after death, he appears in a happy/unhappy destination, even in a heavenly world/hell) which convey that long health, life, beauty and so on in are the result of actions leading to future rebirths. Instead of imparting a subtler and psychologically minded message that the author argues for, we are still left a metaphysical, categorical feeling about it.

These clashes of narrative tone suggest to me that there is something wrong with the text, which when examined, always seems to encounter difficulties when the rebirth periscopes are mentioned.

One example in the Culakammavibhanga Sutta is the passage where the Buddha mentions that long-life (a main concern of the Brahmins who saw long life as to lead to an immortal state) would be the result of not killing living creatures. Here the Buddha is subtlety criticizing the Brahmin performance of animal sacrifices; he is telling the young Brahmin student that by performing the sacrifice he is actually achieving the opposite effect of the intended goal.

Now with the rebirth pericope indicating that a short life will occur in the next life, the whole critique of the Vedic sacrifice no longer makes any sense. By saying that the result will only manifest itself in the next life does not deny that it works in this one. Granted, by killing lots of animals you may end up short lived in the next one, but within this current life you will be very long lived. With the rebirth pericope, it almost seems that the Buddha is agreeing with one aspect of the efficacy of the sacrifice. This is, of course, absurd as the Buddha always denied the efficacy of sacrificing creatures regardless if it whether it was in the present or in the future.

Another example of the rebirth stock passage causing difficulties is the Buddhas explanation for the differences in intelligence amongst human beings:

Here, student, some man or woman does not visit a recluse or a Brahmin and ask: ‘Venerable sir, what is wholesome? What is unwholesome? What is blameable? . . . But if instead he comes back to the human state, then wherever he is reborn he is stupid. . . .

Here, student, some man or woman visits a recluse or a Brahmin and asks: ‘Venerable sir, what is wholesome? What is unwholesome? What is blameable? . . . But if instead he comes back to the human state, then wherever he is reborn he is wise. . . .

If these categorical statements are taken seriously, it necessarily predicts that the vast majority of the coming world’s population will all be mentally impoverished because a good portion of them will not have the chance to meet a Brahman or holy man where they can ask the questions of what is wholesome or not wholesome.

If we remove the pericopes from both these examples, the passages in question start to make much better sense. In the case of the killing it would remove the problem of the effect of a short-life only working in the next life, and with respect with the example of intelligence it would allow for a more reasonable interpretation given its previous categorical nature would be excised. One such interpretation for the intelligence passage might be in seeing intelligence not just as having knowledge passed down by tradition but by actively seeking and questioning those around us.

Conclusion

The Culakammavibhangasutta sutta has been traditionally taught as explaining why people are born in a certain way. This simplistic interpretation does in no way take into account the overall context behind the text and does nothing to question the difficulties the stock passages present. By acknowledging the overall context and removing the stock passages, the text makes much more sense and truly reveals the genius of the Buddha.

Revisiting the Culakammavibhanga Sutta -- Part 1

In an excellent article in the Western Buddhist Review, “Kamma in Context: The Mahakammavibhangasuta and the Culakammavibhangasutta”, the author sheds new light on the Culakammavibhanga sutta by providing context to the text by taking into account the worldview of the Buddha’s interlocutor.

He justifies this approach by arguing that the, “Buddha’s discourses need to be read bearing in mind that he is responding to the world views and life-accounts of others.”

The first part of the article explicates the Buddha’s notion of kamma in relation to the Vedic traditions of the sacrifice, and begins to quote the Culakammavibhanga sutta where the Brahmin student named Subha asks the Buddha:

What is the cause, what is the reason that lowness and excellence are to be seen among human beings . . .those of short life span . . . long life span . . . those of many . . . and of those of few illnesses . . . those whose are ugly, those who are beautiful?

The author then states:

For a Brahman student to be asking the question of the Buddha is interesting, for, within the tradition of the Vedas . . . there are a variety of answers to these questions. The answers lie, in part, within the context of sacrificial rites. . . . Subha is asking about casualty, particulary about causes that bring about worldly benefits.

The author goes on to list such “worldly benefits” found in the Vedas as “life, health and prosperity” which closely matches the things Subha is asking about. From this it can be inferred that Subha is asking such questions as he is curious what the Buddha thinks causes these benefits, perhaps trying to find confirmation of the utility of the Vedic sacrifice or at the least gain another perspective.

It is important to emphasize here that Subha is not asking the Buddha about anything concerning the afterlife; he is asking the Buddha about things concerned with this life.

The Buddha first responds to Subha rather cryptically by saying:

Student, beings are owners of kammas, heirs of kammas, they have kammas as their progenitor, kammas as their kin, kammas as their homing-place. It is kammas that differentiate beings according to inferiority and superiority.

As the author points out, it almost appears that the Buddha is agreeing with Vedic tradition by saying that kamma or action is all important. For in the Vedic tradition, kamma or karma is the ritual action of the sacrifice that is believed to maintain the cosmos and influence the world.

The sutta continues with Subha asking for further clarification and the Buddha replying:

A person who kills living creatures . . . on the dissolution of the body, after death, he appears in an unhappy destination, in perdition, in hell. But if . . . he does not reappear in a state of deprivation . . . but instead comes back to the human status, then wherever he is reborn he tends to be short lived, while a person who refrains from killing living creatures . . . on the dissolution of the body, after death, he appears in a happy destination, even in a heavenly world. But if . . . he does not reappear in a happy destination . . . but instead comes back to the human status, then wherever he is reborn he tends to be long lived.

As the author points out:

As the Buddha goes on to explain in full, it becomes clear that he is using the term ‘kamma’ not in the sense of ritual activity but in a quite different way. . . he is redefining the causal basis of kamma by making a subtle shift in meaning from action to . . . an ethical dimension to the kamma process.

In other words, the Buddha is subtlety redefining kamma as not sacrificial action but ethical action.

This does indeed make perfect sense, yet there is still the issue as to why the cosmological stock passages of being reborn in hell and so on are present. Why would the Buddha be talking in such a categorical fashion about the results of actions in the next life when Subha is clearly asking about how results or differences are manifested in this one?

To me these rebirth pericopes or stock passages do not fit the overall context of the sutta and suggest to me that they are interpolations. I will argue my case in greater detail in part II, demonstrating that such passages were indeed most likely added and do nothing but obscure the more subtle and important message behind the text.