Dog Duty Ascetic and Rebirth -- Part II

In part I, I looked at the Kukkuravatika Sutta, or the Dog Duty Ascetic sutta, to see if it did the support the argument that the Buddha believed in literal rebirth.

By examining the context of the sutta, I pointed out that the Buddha was most likely using skillful means to communicate with the two ascetics by telling them that if they continued to mimic animal behavior they would be born as that animal and not as a god.

His use of skillful means is further illustrated in the later part of the sutta when he gives a short discourse on the four types of kammas after being begged by one of the tearful ascetics who has just come to the realization of the utter uselessness of their animal acts.

The Buddha first elaborates dark kamma which is then followed by bright kamma:

Here someone produces a (kammic) bodily process not (bound up) with affliction, he produces a (kammic) verbal process not (bound up) with affliction, he produces a (kammic) mental process not (bound up) with affliction. By doing so, he reappears in a world without affliction. When that happens, unafflicting contacts touch him. Being touched by these, he feels unafflicting feelings entirely pleasant as in the case of the Subhakinha, the gods of Refulgent Glory.

The Buddha explains that the result of bright kamma is the arising (upapajjati) in an unafflictive “world” (loka) where one experiences, “unafflicting feelings entirely pleasant as in the case of the Subhakinha, the gods of Refulgent Glory.” This is Vedic language. The phrase about arising in a “world” is a Vedic term, which besides denoting a metaphorical space, also has a psychological meaning. In the final sentence of the passage, the Buddha invokes the Vedic folk god Subhakinha.

What is interesting is that the Buddha does not say that one will become that god through such actions, but only that one can experience such feelings worthy of that god.

The Buddha here is essentially telling the ascetics how to obtain their original goal of companionship with god but in a different way. The Buddha is saying that one who is able to experience the same state that a god would experience is to effectively be that god; to enter the state of being of that god is to be it.

By the Buddha giving a psychological dimension to a metaphysical belief system, the Buddha opens up a new perspective and hope for the distraught men. The one ascetic is weeping because he is convinced by the Buddha that he has wasted enormous time in his beastly practices. By offering them a way they can taste their original goal by experiencing it in this life, he turns their despair into happiness by pointing them on a more productive path.

Conclusion

The further elucidation of this sutta should help convince those that claim this sutta clearly shows the Buddha’s belief in rebirth is not the only interpretation. Like in many of the suttas in the Pali Canon, the Buddha uses skillful means to communicate with the various different peoples he meets. This is just one more interesting example of this trend where the Buddha takes on his interlocutor’s language and view point in order to lead them to a different understanding of the world.

Dog Duty Ascetic and Rebirth -- Part I

Many who argue that the Buddha believed in literal rebirth often refer to the interesting Kukkuravatika Sutta, or the Dog Duty Ascetic sutta, to support their claim.

Even a casual glance of the sutta does appear to lend support to their position that the Buddha not only taught but believed in rebirth. The sutta in question relates the Buddha in conversation with two rather bizarre characters, one of which acts like a bull and the other a dog. The two men ask the Buddha what is the result of acting like such animals and the Buddha reluctantly tells them they will both either enter the “animal womb” or niraya (hell).

If we take the sutta at face value it appears to be straight forward with no real room to interpret it in another fashion. However, before making too hasty a conclusion let us try to better understand the context of the sutta by examining these two characters and at least attempt to understand the motivation behind their actions which may bring some insight as to why the Buddha responded as he did.

Doing some research into the ancient Indian texts that were known during the Buddha’s time presents us with evidence that such behavior was indeed present and even sanctioned by the influential and widespread Vedic religious thought. One particular example can be found in the Jaiminiya Brahmana 2.113 and the Taittiriya-Brahmana 2.7.6 which describes such actions as behaving as a bull and even committing incest with one’s own mother as part of the Gosava rite or “vow of the bull.” The Taittiriya-Brahmana explains that such a rite should be consummated if one wants to obtain svarajya or the power of sovereignty or independent dominion (Narayan Jha, 46). It appears that there was belief that by imitating a bull or some other animal one could somehow gain and transfer its power from the animal realm to the human one. This type of primitive belief is very reminiscent of shamanistic beliefs systems shared in many small scale societies.

Why specifically the bull was one of the animals chosen to imitate is not altogether clear, but it is interesting to note that in the Vedas the bull is seen as self-ruling and powerful and often associated with one of the most powerful of the ruling gods: Brahma (Kr Singh, 245).

Another possible reason for such behavior is these ascetics are belaboring under the commonly held ascetic view of the time that by engaging in severe hardships one would later experience pleasant existences due to the equalizing force in the universe. The basic idea of suffering now so as to experience happiness later permeated much of ascetic thought during the Buddha’s time (Gombrich, 37).

In the sutta, the two ascetics never announce their motivation directly, but the Buddha does when he explains to them the result of their practices:

Here, Seniya, someone develops the ox duty fully and unstintingly, he develops the ox habit fully and unstintingly, he develops the ox mind fully and unstintingly, he develops the ox behavior fully and unstintingly. Having done that, on the dissolution of the body, after death, he reappears in the company of oxen. But if his view is such as this: 'By this virtue or duty or asceticism or religious like I shall become a (great) god or some (lesser) god,' that is wrong view in his case.

The Buddha replies in the exact same fashion for the dog ascetic, and we are left to believe that the two characters acted in such a manner in order to arise in a heavenly world as a god or some other higher being.

Maybe the ox performer believed he would become a powerful god like Brahma and the dog ascetic as Sarama -- a high level heavenly dog of Vedic mythology.

Regardless of the exact reasons, both men seem to believe that if they keep with their present course of action they will achieve a better existence as framed within the folds of Vedic belief system.

Now of crucial interest is how the Buddha responds to the question as to what is their final path (abhisamparāya). The Buddha replies that they will either appear in the company or in the companionship (sahavyatā) with the animal imitated or a downward-path (niraya). The fact that the Buddha uses the word companionship, or sahavyatā, is important.

In the Upanishads the ultimate soteriological goal is the union or companionship with Brahma. By the Buddha mentioning companionship with dogs or oxen seems to me to almost poking fun.

The important thing to understand is that the Buddha is using Vedic language to communicate in terms the ascetics are familiar and immersed in. By the Buddha telling the two men that at best they will end up in an oxen or doggy world, he is not just teasing them but pointing out the damage of such beliefs within the fold of the Buddha’s idea of kamma.

By indicating they will end up with animals if they act animals; he is telling them that the results of actions are commensurate with the action itself; by acting like a dog, you becomes a dog and not a god. I also think the Buddha is effectively denying the ascetic belief that by suffering now bliss will be followed later. He is instead saying the opposite is true: by inflicting hardships now will only lead to hardships later.

Understandably the two ascetics are incredibly distraught with the Buddha’s answer and the ox ascetic bursts into tears. In between his weeping, he asks the Buddha a better way to act so he can abandon his ox laden ways.

The Buddha’s answer is very interesting and is the subject of Part II.

References

Gombrich, Richard F. 1996. How Buddhism Began: The Conditioned Genesis of the Early Teachings. London, Althlone Press.

Kr Singh, Nagendra. 1997. Vedic Mythology. New Delhi, A.P.H Publishing Corporation.

Narayan Jha, Dwijendra. 2002. The Myth of the Holy Cow. New Delhi, Verso.

Tull, Herman W. 1989. The Vedic Origins of Karma. Albany, State University of New York Press.

Tathāgata Substituted for Self -- Part III

In part 2 , I provided convincing evidence that the Tathāgata pericope (the Tathāgata exists after death, does not exist after death, both does & does not exist after death) originally had the word “self” instead of the word Tathāgata which the suttas currently contain.

At the end of the essay I raised the important questions of why the systemizers changed it the pericope in the first place and why they chose to replace the word “self” explicitly with Tathāgata.

While any such answers may indeed be speculation, I do believe there are motifs in some of the suttas which hint at a reasonable explanation.

In the Bhikkhu Sutta, the Buddha declares, “Monk, whatever one stays obsessed with, that's what one is measured by.” The Buddha goes on in the sutta to elaborate the meaning of this statement by saying:

If one doesn't stay obsessed with form, monk, that's not what one is measured by. Whatever one isn't measured by, that's not how one is classified.

If one doesn't stay obsessed with feeling...

If one doesn't stay obsessed with perception...

If one doesn't stay obsessed with fabrications...

If one doesn't stay obsessed with consciousness, that's not what one is measured by.

Whatever one isn't measured by, that's not how one is classified.

In this very profound sutta the Buddha declares that we can only measure or classify “what one is” when we obsess over the five aggregates (form, feeling, perception, fabrications and consciousness) or elements of our experience and provide it with a conceptual identify we label as “me”.

Conversely, when we do not obsess or crave over the five aggregates of experience, we no longer participate in the creation of a notion of a being and thus there is no longer anything to measure or classify against.

This for the Buddha is what it means to become enlightened and make an end of suffering. It is important to understand that the Buddha is referring to going beyond the classification of a notion of me and not a particular attribute attributed to an enlightened being.

However, this has traditionally been interpreted in such a sense, contributing to one important piece of doctrinal misunderstanding that helps explain why “self” was changed to Tathāgata.

Another sutta which relates the same notion of the illusion of being is in the Aggi-Vacchagotta Sutta where the wanderer Vacchagotta asks a series of metaphysical questions that the Buddha refuses to answer. In exasperation, Vacchagotta asks the Buddha whether he has, “any position at all?"

The Buddha answers by saying, "A 'position,' Vaccha, is something that a Tathagata has done away with. I say, a Tathagata — with the ending, fading out, cessation, renunciation, & relinquishment of all construings, all excogitations, all I-making & mine-making & obsession with conceit — is, through lack of clinging/sustenance, released."

Vacchagotta persists by asking, “But, Master Gotama, the monk whose mind is thus released: Where does he reappear?"

The Buddha replies that any notion of reappearing, appearing, appearing and not reappearing and so on do not apply. At this point Vacchagotta exclaims he is “confused” and has “no clarity.” The Buddha councils him and tells him it is not surprising he is confused given that such an understanding is “subtle, to-be-experienced by the wise.”

The Buddha then questions Vacchagotta on what happens to a fire that runs out of fuel:

And suppose someone were to ask you, Vaccha, 'This fire burning in front of you, dependent on what is it burning?' Thus asked, how would you reply?

...I would reply, 'This fire burning in front of me is burning dependent on grass & timber as its sustenance.'

If the fire burning in front of you were to go out, would you know that, 'This fire burning in front of me has gone out'?

...yes...

And suppose someone were to ask you, 'This fire that has gone out in front of you, in which direction from here has it gone? East? West? North? Or south?' Thus asked, how would you reply?

That doesn't apply, Master Gotama. Any fire burning dependent on a sustenance of grass and timber, being unnourished — from having consumed that sustenance and not being offered any other — is classified simply as 'out' (unbound).

Even so, Vaccha, any physical form by which one describing the Tathagata would describe him: That the Tathagata has abandoned, its root destroyed, made like a palmyra stump, deprived of the conditions of development, not destined for future arising. Freed from the classification of form, Vaccha, the Tathagata is deep, boundless, hard to fathom, like the sea. 'Reappears' doesn't apply. 'Does not reappear' doesn't apply. 'Both does & does not reappear' doesn't apply. 'Neither reappears nor does not reappear' doesn't apply.

The Buddha repeats the last passage for the rest of aggregates (feeling, perceptions, fabrications and consciousness) the sutta ends with Vacchagotta becoming a convert.

The key part of the sutta is the fire simile where the sustenance of a fire is metaphorically associated with the five aggregates. The fire is dependent on grass and timber just like the notion of a being, being dependent on the five aggregates. When the fire goes out due to lack of sustenance, like the notion of being going out due to the experience of the aggregates being abandoned, it is no longer meaningful to ask where the fire has gone in the way as it is to ask where the notion of being has gone.

This is expressing in essence what the first sutta did but in a different manner. Both indicate that something can only persist dependent on the input of something else; and this something else can be relinquished. But most importantly the main point is the same: there is no classification or measurement of something that can no longer be experienced.

And this is the key because when there is no fire or no obsession over being, there is no longer the experience of suffering.

Unfortunately, this particular sutta has been understood too literally to indicate two things: there is no rebirth for an enlightened being as there is no substrate left for it to occur and the status of an enlightened being after death is unknown. To interpret the text in this fashion is to ascribe the Buddha with a position which goes clearly against what the Buddha said earlier as having “no position.” The point is that whether there is rebirth, no rebirth, known or unknown status is not the question for such questions do not apply. As such questions no longer make sense, there is no position that can be taken even if one wanted to. This is the reason the Buddha stated he has no position.

The crux of the traditional misunderstanding centers on seeing the notion of being as an actual existing entity rather than a psychological projection. Understanding the text from a psychological perspective is clearly indicated by the Buddha who describes an enlightened being earlier in the sutta as one who has relinquished the psychological process of, "all I-making & mine making."

To be fair, to read the text from an ontological perspective is not helped by the fact that the Buddha meets Vacchagota half way when he persists in trying to explicitly get an answer to a question of the ontological status of a being after death. Through his skillful means, the Buddha takes on Vacchagota's ontological thinking and goes ahead and posits a thing, in this case a fire, in order to make the point that such questions of continuation do not make sense.

Having examined two suttas we now have two fairly clear motifs of the traditional misunderstanding derived from them: the indescribability of an enlightened being and the unknown status of an enlightened being after death.

Keeping these two motifs in mind, we can now gain a glimpse as to why “self” was substituted with Tathāgata.

The systemizers were most likely puzzled when they discovered in the suttas the Buddha refusing to directly answer whether the self exists or does not exist after death. At this point in history, the idea of karma and rebirth was firmly established and they saw no reason why the Buddha did not reply by saying the self in a way does exist after death by the means of rebirth.

For the compilers, the Buddha’s refusal to answer whether the self exists after death only made sense for enlightened beings and not for beings in general that the “self” in the pericope seemed to indicate. In their minds, when the Buddha refused to declare the status of the self after death, the Buddha must have understood this question as referring to enlightened beings as this is the only reason they could see for the Buddha’s silence. As enlightened beings were seen as being “unfathomable” and beyond any notions after death, it made sense for the Buddha to remain silent for the question could not be answered.

Thinking that they were clarifying the true meaning, they thus changed the pericope to refer to the Tathāgata instead of the self.

Tathāgata Substituted for Self? -- Part II

In Part I, I argued that there was something suspicious about the stock phrase or periscope that asks these various questions on the state of a Tathāgata after death.

As I pointed out, the Tathāgata after death pericope or stock passage is found throughout the Pali Canon suggesting this was a hot topic of debate amongst the many spiritual seekers of the day. Yet, when we look at the famous Brahmajala Sutta attributed with capturing all the speculative views of the time, we do not find a view questioning the state of a Tathāgata after death. It seems amazing that the religious seekers of the day were only concerned on the issue of life after death for a specialized being rather than beings in general. These observations led me to postulate that the Tathāgata pericope originally mentioned the self and not a Tathāgata.

If my supposition that the “self” was substituted with Tathāgata is true, can we find such evidence in the suttas?

One sutta that appears to lend credence to my supposition is the Sariputta-Kotthita Sutta. The sutta begins with the the young Sariputta asking the venerable Kothita on the status of the Tathāgata after death. Kothita replies that the “Blessed one has not declared” the status of the Tathāgata after death. Sariputta then aks, “what is the cause, what is the reason, why that has not been declared by the Blessed One?" Kotthita responds by enumerating over each of the four aggregates (form, feeling, perception, fabrications and consciousness) using the same refrain in each aggregate finally ending with consciousness:

For one who loves consciousness, who is fond of consciousness, who cherishes consciousness, who does not know or see, as it actually is present, the cessation of consciousness, there occurs the thought, 'The Tathagata exists after death' or 'The Tathagata does not exist after death' or 'The Tathagata both exists and does not exist after death' or 'The Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist after death.'

It seems hard to believe, which this passage seems to suggest, is that a person who “loves consciousness” (or any of the aggregates mentioned prior) would naturally obsess on the state of an enlightened being after death. An argument can be made that almost everyone in the world loves any of the aggregates (body, feelings, consciousness and so on) yet the vast majority of the people do not dwell on the questions of the afterlife of an enlightened being. For many, the very concept of an enlightened being does not even exist!

However, if Tathāgata is substituted with “self” then the passage makes perfect sense. A person who loves the aggregates, which gives the impression of a being existing over time, will naturally entertain such questions of the afterlife. It is only when we have personal notions of me or mine does the question of the continuation of the that very me or the self become a concern.

Throughout human history in all cultures ancient to modern, the question of life after death has always being raised. It is a question fundamental to human existence. As such, it seems far more probable that a person would naturally question the continuation of the “self” rather than a special rarified being.

This sutta is by all means not an isolated case where the word “self” seems to fit better than Tathāgata. In the Anguttara Nikaya, we find the Avyakata Sutta offering a similar example. In this sutta, a monk asks the Buddha why an Arahant or enlightened one does not possess any uncertainty over various “undeclared issues.” The Buddha responds by saying:

Because of the cessation of views, monk, uncertainty doesn't arise in an instructed disciple of the noble ones over the undeclared issues. The view-standpoint, 'The Tathagata exists after death,' the view-standpoint, 'The Tathagata doesn't exist after death,' the view-standpoint, 'The Tathagata both does and doesn't exist after death,' the view-standpoint, 'The Tathagata neither does nor doesn't exist after death'

The Buddha continues to say that the average person suffers namely because he still harbors such views:

For him that view grows. He is not freed from birth, aging, & death; from sorrows, lamentations, pains, distresses, and despairs. He is not freed, I tell you, from suffering & stress.

So according to the Buddha, a normal person suffers due to “that view [which] grows” which is, of course, the view of the Tathāgata after death. If we take this seriously, then it appears the reason for suffering in the world is because everyone dwells on the view of the state of an enlightened being after death. Obviously this is plainly ridiculous.

If the Tathāgata is replaced with the “self” then the passage becomes a lot more intelligible. People suffer because of a tendency in human beings to personalize events a person experiences; they form views that center on the assumption that the events somehow were directed at or happen to a projection of the me or I.

Interestingly, the commentaries noted that the Tathāgata should be understood as “satto” or a general being. Obviously, they also saw difficulties with the use of Tathāgata.

My final example comes from the Anuradha Sutta. The sutta begins with a group of religious wanders questioning the Buddhist monk Anuradho on how the Tathāgata describes another enlightened being:

Friend Anuradha, the Tathagata — the supreme man, the superlative man, attainer of the superlative attainment — being described, is described with [one of] these four positions: The Tathagata exists after death, does not exist after death, both does & does not exist after death, neither exists nor does not exist after death.

Oddly instead of these religious wanders enquiring on the theme of life after death of a general being, they seem concerned about an enlightened being only.

It is of interest to note in Bhikkhu Bodhi’s faithful translation of this same sutta, he translates instead of "the Tathagata . . . being described" as “Tathagata describes a Tathagata.” This rather cumbersome grammatically correct translation is an immediate flag that maybe the text has been touched.

The sutta continues with Anuradha incorrectly answering the wanderers who leav him and he goes to the Buddha to ask what he should have said. After admonishing the monk the Buddha begins questioning Anuradha, in a now familiar fashion, on whether he sees the five attributes (form, feeling, perception, fabrications and consciousness) as self. Anuradha replies in the negative in each case, and the Buddha continues:

"And is that which is inconstant easeful or stressful?"

"Stressful, lord."

"And is it proper to regard what is inconstant, stressful, subject to change as: 'This is mine. This is my self. This is what I am'?"

"No, lord."

"What do you think, Anuradha: Do you regard form as the Tathagata?"

"No, lord."

"Do you regard feeling as the Tathagata?"

"No, lord."

"Do you regard perception as the Tathagata?"

"No, lord."

"Do you regard fabrications as the Tathagata?"

"No, lord."

"Do you regard consciousness as the Tathagata?"

"No, lord."

Strangely enough, right after asking the question whether it is, “proper to regard . . . This is my self,” the Buddha immediately questions Anuradha not on the “self” but on a Tathāgata. It is fairly obvious here that the Tathāgata does not fit the context of the passage and it most likely contained the "self" instead of the Tathāgata.

It is important to note that in many different suttas where the aggregates are discussed usually a comparison is made with the self or anatta or not-self. The famous Pañcavaggi Sutta is just one example where the Buddha exhorts his listeners to see form, feeling, perception, thought-fabrications and consciousness as anatta or not-self.

As with the Avyakata Sutta the commentaries of the Anuradha Sutta again suggest “being” or satta for the Tathāgata (see the note to Maurice Walsh’s translation of this sutta).

There are more examples which provide further evidence, but for now I will leave these examples aside as some more important questions arise. If we can accept that the periscope did get changed, why did it occur and if restored to its original state how does it change the usual traditional meaning? This I hope to answer in part III.

Tathāgata Substituted for Self? Part I

The Buddha is portrayed in the Pali Canon as eschewing metaphysical discussions. One such metaphysical question the Buddha refused to answer was the question on the state of a tathāgata after death. The following stock phrase or pericope is used in many suttas:

Does the Tathāgata exist after death?
Does the Tathāgata not exist after death?
Does the Tathāgata both exist and not exist after death?
Does the Tathāgata a neither exist nor not exist after death?

The word tathāgata is an epithet for the Buddha. Its most common usage is by the Buddha who uses the word to refer to himself in third person. Its exact meaning has been debated by scholars, but there is general agreement that the word is used to designate an enlightened or awakened being.

Curiously, there is no evidence to suggest that the word tathāgata was wildly used by non-Buddhist groups during the Buddha’s time. The word tathāgata is hardly found at all in the non-Buddhist Indian literature, and in the few places in the Jain sutras where it is used to explicitly refer to an enlightened being, the Prakrit word tahāgaya is used instead which may not even originate from the same etymological root.

Another interesting fact is that none of the speculative views concerning the tathāgata after death is mentioning among the 62 wrong views in the Brahmajāla Sutta. These 62 wrong views are portrayed in the sutta as being an exhaustive categorization of all speculative views during the Buddha’s time.

To be fair, there is one instance of the tathāgata after death pericope in the Brahmajāla Sutta, but the usage is not tallied as one of the 62 wrong views but instead is used in an off-hand way to illustrative how the eel-wigglers respond to such metaphysical questions. In the Chinese version of the Brahmajāla Sutta the pericope is not present at all.

While there is no doubt that the Brahmajāla Sutta has been formulized and obtained various accretions, the antiquity of the sutta is well attested by the fact of it being mentioned in the first Buddhist council and being separately translated into Chinese prior to the creation of the Chinese Dirgha Agama. It being placed first in the Pali Canon is further testament to its high reputation among the early Buddhists (Pande 81).

While the Brahmajāla Sutta does not mention as one of its wrong views the tathāgata’s state after death, it does, however, enumerate a total of 24 different views on the subject of life after death (16 for some sort of continuation after death with 8 views denying any continuation). This high number (around a quarter) of views in regards to the question of life after death indicates that this was an important and often discussed religious issue in the Buddha’s time.

This is not really surprising given that all the religious traditions in the world have at some point debated such questions and India was no exception in this regard.

But if the issue of life after death was such a hot issue of debate during the Buddha’s day, why do we find the stock passage of what happens to an enlightened being after death instead of what happens to an individual (regardless of spiritual attainment) after death like the views expressed in the Brahmajāla Sutta?

It just seems incredulous that all the religious seekers of the day were only concerned about a subset of a select few beings (enlightened ones) rather than the general set of human beings.

One possible solution to these difficulties is that the suttas originally did contain passages on life after death of a being in general but was systematically changed later to an enlightened being.

At first glance this may seem a rather remote and dubious proposition, but I will show in following essays that there is strong evidence that this indeed occur.

References

Pande, Govind Chandra. Fourth Revised Edition, 1995. Studies in the Origins of Buddhism. (Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass : 2006).

Intrusive Interpolations in the Potthapada Sutta -- Part II

In part 1, I argued that there were interpolations made to the Potthapada Sutta as the result of systemization. In this second part, I will continue to build upon my argument by demonstrating that the concluding sections of the sutta exhibit the same problems of interpolations which result in obscuring the main purport of the text.

In the second half of the sutta the Buddha talks about the realities of the perceived self or atta-patilabha to a wanderer named Potthapada.

After the Buddha describes to Potthapada the wanderer that his soteriological goal is to abandon the acquired self, he asks Potthapada a series of questions:

Suppose they were to ask you: 'Did you exist in the past? Did you not not exist? Will you exist in the future? Will you not not exist? Do you exist now? Do you not not exist?' Thus asked, how would you answer?

Potthapada replies that he would say, “I existed in the past. I did not not exist. I will exist in the future. I will not not exist. I exist now. I do not not exist.”

Here the Buddha is asking a direct question on Potthapada’s perceived existence over time. There is no talk of past lives, and when the Buddha is asking Potthapada whether he “exist[ed] in the past,” it can only be construed that the Buddha is inquiring into the life that Potthapada can perceive here and now.

Hearing the wanderer’s answers, the Buddha continues:

Suppose, Citta, they were to ask you: 'Whatever your past acquisition of a self: Is that alone your true acquisition of self, while the future & present ones are null & void? Whatever your future acquisition of a self: Is that alone your true acquisition of a self, while the past & present ones are null & void? Whatever your present acquisition of a self: Is that alone your true acquisition of a self, while the past & future ones are null & void?' Thus asked, how would you answer?

...Thus asked, lord, I would answer: 'Whatever my past acquisition of a self: on that occasion, that alone was my true acquisition of a self, while future & present ones were null & void. Whatever my future acquisition of a self: on that occasion, that alone will be my true acquisition of a self, while the past & present ones will be null & void. Whatever my present acquisition of a self: on that occasion, that alone is my true acquisition of a self, while the past & future ones are null & void.'

It is important to note here that the only difference between this question and the previous one is the Buddha's elaboration of the "I" into the “true acquisition of a self.” The Buddha is doing this in an effort to help Potthapada to draw a connection between the "I" and the "acquired self" in order to shift the understanding of the “I” from a presupposed thing to an acquired concept.

The key here is that these passages have nothing to do with establishing the reality of an ontological self. On the contrary, the passages seem to move in the opposite direction by implying that the “I” is not something someone has but mentally acquires.

In an abrupt shift, the sutta continues with Buddha expounding an ontological view of the self that startlingly resembles the Upanishad's:

In the same way, Citta, when there is a gross acquisition of a self... it's classified just as a gross acquisition of a self. When there is a mind-made acquisition of a self... When there is a formless acquisition of a self, it's not classified either as a gross acquisition of a self or as a mind-made acquisition of a self. It's classified just as a formless acquisition of a self.

Just as when milk comes from a cow, curds from milk, butter from curds, ghee from butter, and the skimmings of ghee from ghee. When there is milk, it's not classified as curds, butter, ghee, or skimmings of ghee. It's classified just as milk. When there are curds... When there is butter... When there is ghee... When there are the skimmings of ghee, they're not classified as milk, curds, butter, or ghee. They're classified just as the skimmings of ghee.

The passage appears to convey the idea that once you have acquired one of the three selfs, for example, the gross self of the body, that acquired self will persist as long as one can maintain it. Once that particular self changes to another type, for example, a gross self changing into a formless self (presumably after death), nothing is left behind from what it was before. While the self’s overall form may change, like milk changing into butter, the underlying essence that keeps the self together still persists (butter is still milk but simply has a different appearance and consistency).

What is amazing about this passage is that the Buddha seems to be conveying a Vedic view of the self which blatantly contradicts the Buddha’s notion of anatta or not-self.

Interestingly the sutta continues with the Buddha concluding, “Citta, these are the world's designations, the world's expressions, the world's ways of speaking, the world's descriptions, with which the Tathagata expresses himself but without grasping to them.”

Even though in the very last passage the Buddha is depicted as presenting a Vedic notion of the self, we are summarily reminded that the Buddha’s mentioning of the self is just a worldly expression that is used to express an idea and by no means used to designate an actual underlying reality.

What is going on here?

Before answering this question, it is important to reexamine the milk simile which seems to be the core element of the Buddha’s argument. The first thing that is interesting about this simile is that it refers to a total of five different states (milk, curds, butter, ghee, skimmings of ghee) yet there are only three different types of acquired selfs (gross, mind and formless). The second issue with the simile is that there is a fundamental difference between milk transition states and self transition states. In the case of milk, once a state has transitioned into another state there can be no reversal to the previous one, for example, ghee cannot be turned back into butter. However, with the three different kinds of self, this is not the case. It is quite easy to see, for example, the gross self transitioning into a mind made self which can transition back to the gross self.

What is suspicious about the Buddha alluding to the gross self, mind-made self and the formless self as being merely “world’s expressions” or conventional forms of speech is that no one in ancient India referred to themselves via these three different types of selves as if they were common expressions that everyone immediately knew what one was referring to.

The central problem behind all these interpretive issues stems from the idea of an ontological notion of the self as a “thing” that is acquired. If we can for the moment understand the self as a conventional conceptual entity a person is attributed with or acquires, and look at these passages from this perspective, we find that all the issues raised suddenly dissipate.

For example, if we look at the milk simile and understand the various different maturation stages of milk as being analogous to the different maturation stages of individual (baby, boy/girl, adolescent, man/woman, old man/old woman) everything makes sense. Like milk that transitions irreversibly from one stage to the next so does an individual.

What more, the usage of the terms baby, boy, adolescent, man and so on are conventional terms unlike the three selfs.

Understanding the simile in this way makes the central point a lot more transparent. The chief idea being is that the various stages are just expressions that capture a particular stage of a process that is continually changing through time. The fact that we use such terms does in no way indicate an underlying essential entity. What one may mistake as a concrete permanent entity is simply a process of change that we habitually abstract and reify an ontological concept out of.

Conclusion

The Potthapada Sutta is a profound sutta which demonstrates the Buddha’s view on the self. Through interpolations linked with scholarly systemization, the central purport of the sutta has unfortunately been obscured. By interpreting the key passages from the perspective of the conceptual self in this life instead of three types of selves in subsequent future lives, it becomes clear that the Buddha is expounding the notion of anatta and not an explanation of the continuity of a life through rebirth as the common traditional interpretations have posited.

Intrusive Interpolations In the Potthapada Sutta -- Part I

The Potthapada Sutta from the Digha Nikaya is an interesting one. The sutta contains two conversations between the Buddha and the wanderer Potthapada on two separate occasions. The first conversation begins with Potthapada asking the Buddha on what is the “ultimate cessation of perception” followed by further questioning by Potthapada on various speculative questions on the nature of the soul, whether it exists after death and so on. The Buddha declines to answer these last series of questions positing that he does so because it is not conducive towards enlightenment. The first conversation ends with the Buddha leaving and Potthapada’s admitting that he doesn’t fully understand why the Buddha declined to the answer the speculative questions asked of him.

A couple of days later, Potthapada seeks out the Buddha and asks him to clarify why the Buddha did not answer the speculative questions previously asked. The Buddha goes on to repeat that such questions he declares as uncertain because they are not conducive towards enlightenment.

The Buddha goes on to say that there are ascetics who proclaim that, "After death, the self is exclusively happy and free from disease” and when questioned on this statement, none of them could offer a means to achieve this end and none of them could say they experienced what they proclaimed. In a famous simile the Buddha says:

Potthapada, it's as if a man were to say, 'I'm in love with the most beautiful woman in this country,' and other people were to say to him, 'Well, my good man, this most beautiful woman in this country with whom you are in love: do you know if she's of the warrior caste, the priestly caste, the merchant caste, or the laborer caste?' and, when asked this, he would say, 'No.' Then they would say to him, 'Well then, do you know her name or clan name? Whether she's tall, short, or of medium height? Whether she's dark, fair, or ruddy-skinned? Do you know what village or town or city she's from?' When asked this, he would say, 'No.' Then they would say to him, 'So you've never known or seen the woman you're in love with?' When asked this, he would say, 'Yes.'

The Buddha provides another simile and continues by saying, “Potthapada, there are these three acquisitions of a self (atta-patilabha): the gross acquisition of a self, the mind-made acquisition of a self, and the formless acquisition of a self.”

What is interesting about this passage is that the self is listed as possessing three different categories or types. This list oriented analytical style appears to be a scholastic elaboration performed by the systemizers hinting at the passage possibly being inauthentic.

Another interesting feature of this passage is the usage of the Pali compound word atta-patilabha which is translated, in this passage at least, as “acquisition of a self.” In the Pali English Dictionary the verb, paṭilabhati is defined as to obtain, receive and is derived from the verb root labh- (to get) with the prefix pati- (on to, at). From this, we get a sense of the word atta-patilabha as an acquired or obtained self.

I think the Buddha specifically used such a term to indicate that our notion of self is not intrinsic to man (remember the Buddha’s anatta or not-self) but something that is necessarily constructed or “acquired” through convention, beliefs and so on. The Buddha’s emphasis by using the word atta-paṭilabha seems to center here on human psychology instead of ontology as the list of three different kinds of selves seems to suggest.

If we take this list of different acquired selves and broach the question of how one may acquire such selves we soon run into difficulties. For example, how can one who already has a gross self (as defined by the Buddha in the next couple of sentences as the four great elements or the body) acquire another gross self if he or she already has one? Of course, one can say you can "acquire" a gross self by being reborn, but why use the word paṭilabha (acquired) in the first place? Why not just say there are three types of selves (gross, mind-made and formless) and leave it at that?

Following this rather problematic passage, the Buddha continues on to say:

I teach the Dhamma for the abandoning of the gross acquisition of a self, such that, when you practice it, defiling mental qualities will be abandoned, bright mental qualities will grow, and you will enter & remain in the culmination & abundance of discernment, having known & realized it for yourself in the here & now.

It appears fairly clear that the Buddha is saying that one can get rid of the “gross acquisition of a self” by “abandoning . . . defiling mental qualities.” At first glance it seems reasonable. But when you reread the statement it almost sounds like with the abandonment of defiling mental qualities the body itself become abandoned which seems to suggest it disappears or immediately breaks down.

If instead we substitute the “gross” acquisition of a self with just the “acquired self”, which I indicated is a purely mental construct, then this passage makes a lot more sense. As our sense of who and what we are is based on our mental apparatus, it seems logical that when we can abandon the “mental qualities” emanating from this mental apparatus the whole notion of a self is necessarily abandoned as well.

In part II, I will continue my analysis of the sutta and show that one of most famous similes in the Pali canon has been obscured further suggesting that this sutta has suffered from interpolations.