Tathāgata Substituted for Self? -- Part II

In Part I, I argued that there was something suspicious about the stock phrase or periscope that asks these various questions on the state of a Tathāgata after death.

As I pointed out, the Tathāgata after death pericope or stock passage is found throughout the Pali Canon suggesting this was a hot topic of debate amongst the many spiritual seekers of the day. Yet, when we look at the famous Brahmajala Sutta attributed with capturing all the speculative views of the time, we do not find a view questioning the state of a Tathāgata after death. It seems amazing that the religious seekers of the day were only concerned on the issue of life after death for a specialized being rather than beings in general. These observations led me to postulate that the Tathāgata pericope originally mentioned the self and not a Tathāgata.

If my supposition that the “self” was substituted with Tathāgata is true, can we find such evidence in the suttas?

One sutta that appears to lend credence to my supposition is the Sariputta-Kotthita Sutta. The sutta begins with the the young Sariputta asking the venerable Kothita on the status of the Tathāgata after death. Kothita replies that the “Blessed one has not declared” the status of the Tathāgata after death. Sariputta then aks, “what is the cause, what is the reason, why that has not been declared by the Blessed One?" Kotthita responds by enumerating over each of the four aggregates (form, feeling, perception, fabrications and consciousness) using the same refrain in each aggregate finally ending with consciousness:

For one who loves consciousness, who is fond of consciousness, who cherishes consciousness, who does not know or see, as it actually is present, the cessation of consciousness, there occurs the thought, 'The Tathagata exists after death' or 'The Tathagata does not exist after death' or 'The Tathagata both exists and does not exist after death' or 'The Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist after death.'

It seems hard to believe, which this passage seems to suggest, is that a person who “loves consciousness” (or any of the aggregates mentioned prior) would naturally obsess on the state of an enlightened being after death. An argument can be made that almost everyone in the world loves any of the aggregates (body, feelings, consciousness and so on) yet the vast majority of the people do not dwell on the questions of the afterlife of an enlightened being. For many, the very concept of an enlightened being does not even exist!

However, if Tathāgata is substituted with “self” then the passage makes perfect sense. A person who loves the aggregates, which gives the impression of a being existing over time, will naturally entertain such questions of the afterlife. It is only when we have personal notions of me or mine does the question of the continuation of the that very me or the self become a concern.

Throughout human history in all cultures ancient to modern, the question of life after death has always being raised. It is a question fundamental to human existence. As such, it seems far more probable that a person would naturally question the continuation of the “self” rather than a special rarified being.

This sutta is by all means not an isolated case where the word “self” seems to fit better than Tathāgata. In the Anguttara Nikaya, we find the Avyakata Sutta offering a similar example. In this sutta, a monk asks the Buddha why an Arahant or enlightened one does not possess any uncertainty over various “undeclared issues.” The Buddha responds by saying:

Because of the cessation of views, monk, uncertainty doesn't arise in an instructed disciple of the noble ones over the undeclared issues. The view-standpoint, 'The Tathagata exists after death,' the view-standpoint, 'The Tathagata doesn't exist after death,' the view-standpoint, 'The Tathagata both does and doesn't exist after death,' the view-standpoint, 'The Tathagata neither does nor doesn't exist after death'

The Buddha continues to say that the average person suffers namely because he still harbors such views:

For him that view grows. He is not freed from birth, aging, & death; from sorrows, lamentations, pains, distresses, and despairs. He is not freed, I tell you, from suffering & stress.

So according to the Buddha, a normal person suffers due to “that view [which] grows” which is, of course, the view of the Tathāgata after death. If we take this seriously, then it appears the reason for suffering in the world is because everyone dwells on the view of the state of an enlightened being after death. Obviously this is plainly ridiculous.

If the Tathāgata is replaced with the “self” then the passage becomes a lot more intelligible. People suffer because of a tendency in human beings to personalize events a person experiences; they form views that center on the assumption that the events somehow were directed at or happen to a projection of the me or I.

Interestingly, the commentaries noted that the Tathāgata should be understood as “satto” or a general being. Obviously, they also saw difficulties with the use of Tathāgata.

My final example comes from the Anuradha Sutta. The sutta begins with a group of religious wanders questioning the Buddhist monk Anuradho on how the Tathāgata describes another enlightened being:

Friend Anuradha, the Tathagata — the supreme man, the superlative man, attainer of the superlative attainment — being described, is described with [one of] these four positions: The Tathagata exists after death, does not exist after death, both does & does not exist after death, neither exists nor does not exist after death.

Oddly instead of these religious wanders enquiring on the theme of life after death of a general being, they seem concerned about an enlightened being only.

It is of interest to note in Bhikkhu Bodhi’s faithful translation of this same sutta, he translates instead of "the Tathagata . . . being described" as “Tathagata describes a Tathagata.” This rather cumbersome grammatically correct translation is an immediate flag that maybe the text has been touched.

The sutta continues with Anuradha incorrectly answering the wanderers who leav him and he goes to the Buddha to ask what he should have said. After admonishing the monk the Buddha begins questioning Anuradha, in a now familiar fashion, on whether he sees the five attributes (form, feeling, perception, fabrications and consciousness) as self. Anuradha replies in the negative in each case, and the Buddha continues:

"And is that which is inconstant easeful or stressful?"

"Stressful, lord."

"And is it proper to regard what is inconstant, stressful, subject to change as: 'This is mine. This is my self. This is what I am'?"

"No, lord."

"What do you think, Anuradha: Do you regard form as the Tathagata?"

"No, lord."

"Do you regard feeling as the Tathagata?"

"No, lord."

"Do you regard perception as the Tathagata?"

"No, lord."

"Do you regard fabrications as the Tathagata?"

"No, lord."

"Do you regard consciousness as the Tathagata?"

"No, lord."

Strangely enough, right after asking the question whether it is, “proper to regard . . . This is my self,” the Buddha immediately questions Anuradha not on the “self” but on a Tathāgata. It is fairly obvious here that the Tathāgata does not fit the context of the passage and it most likely contained the "self" instead of the Tathāgata.

It is important to note that in many different suttas where the aggregates are discussed usually a comparison is made with the self or anatta or not-self. The famous Pañcavaggi Sutta is just one example where the Buddha exhorts his listeners to see form, feeling, perception, thought-fabrications and consciousness as anatta or not-self.

As with the Avyakata Sutta the commentaries of the Anuradha Sutta again suggest “being” or satta for the Tathāgata (see the note to Maurice Walsh’s translation of this sutta).

There are more examples which provide further evidence, but for now I will leave these examples aside as some more important questions arise. If we can accept that the periscope did get changed, why did it occur and if restored to its original state how does it change the usual traditional meaning? This I hope to answer in part III.