Pericope Problems in the Mahakammavibhanga Sutta - Part 2

In part 1, I examined the Mahakammavibhanga Sutta pointing out some evidence for interpolations and argued that that the same conclusion could still be made, and even clarified, if the interpolations were removed.

My strongest argument for the text being tampered with is located in the concluding passages where the Buddha spells out the main point to be drawn from the sutta:

As to the person here who kills living beings . . . and on the dissolution of the body, after death, reappears in a state of deprivation . . . even in hell: either earlier he did an evil action to be felt as painful, or later he did an evil action to be felt as painful. . . .

As to the person here who kills living beings . . . and on the dissolution of the body, after death, reappears in a happy destination . . . in the heavenly world: either earlier he did a good action to be felt as pleasant, or later he did an action to be felt as pleasant . . .

As to the person here who abstains from living beings . . . and on the dissolution of the body, after death, reappears in a happy destination . . . in the heavenly world: either earlier he did a good action to be felt as pleasant, or later he did an action to be felt as pleasant . . .

As to the person here who abstains from living beings . . . and on the dissolution of the body, after death, reappears in a state of deprivation . . . even in hell: either earlier he did an evil action to be felt as painful, or later he did an evil action to be felt as painful.

The difficulty with these passages lies with the mixing of psychological processes with metaphysical ones. The juxtaposition of two distinctly disparate processes together in an effort to suggest they are somehow related leaves a rather contrived feeling; it almost seems that the author is trying to force two things together that simply do not belong together.

It is essential to note that at the beginning of the sutta the Buddha gave a brief, concise exposition on kamma conveying that the fruits of an intentional action lead to either pleasant, unpleasant, or neither pleasant or unpleasant feelings. The passages quoted above appear to be a continuation of this initial mentioning, but the link between the two is not as clear with the various metaphysical pericopes or stock passages interspersed amongst the core textual element of kamma and the resultant feeling.

If we take these concluding passages at face value the basic import seems to be that any intentional action which produces a certain feeling will lead to a particular post mortem existence. For example, if we commit “an evil action to be felt as painful”, we will end up in hell.

But this is problematic. What happens to one who commits an evil action to be felt as pleasurable and not painful (for example, putting cocaine in someone’s drink)? Do we still go to hell or do we go to heaven? In a similar case, what happens if we commit a good action to be felt as painful (violently pushing a person aside so they do not get hit by a moving vehicle), does that mean we will end up in hell?

Another issue is the fact that a person will commit thousands if not hundreds of thousands of intentional actions over the course of a lifetime that could be described as causing pleasurable or painful feelings. So which of these actions determine our post mortem destiny? All of them? Only the worst ones? The actions that have the most prevalence? Do we go to hell or heaven equal to number of times we experience pleasant or unpleasant feelings? Or do we only go once? But which one, heaven or hell, or both?

As argued in part one, we can go ahead and remove these stock passages (and add a few logical substitutions based on the Buddha’s first succinct exposition of kamma in the intial part of the sutta) and still reach the same overall conclusion of the text:

As to the person who did an evil action and feels pain: either earlier he did an evil action to be felt as painful, or later he did an evil action to be felt as painful. . . .

As to the person here who did an evil action and feels pleasure: either earlier he did a good action to be felt as pleasant, or later he did a good action to be felt as pleasant . . .

As to the person here who did a good action and feels pleasure: either earlier he did a good action to be felt as pleasant . . .

As to the person here who did a good action and feels pleasure: either earlier he did an evil action to be felt as painful, or later he did an evil action to be felt as painful.

Notice that this constructed passage is now a lot clearer and also follows logically from the Buddha’s initial exposition that solely described a psychological process. The difficulties I described above are for a large part now gone.

Conclusion

The Buddha took the Vedic notion of kamma and gave it a psychological and ethical dimension to it. This was a revolutionary innovation which was more subtle than the prevailing notions of karma at the time.

The Mahakammavibhanga Sutta is a sutta that I believe originally delved deeper into the psychological aspect of kamma and not the cosmological aspect in an effort to remind the reader to be careful about drawing conclusions about kamma and thus moral causality when examining instances where one lacks the capability of obtaining all the necessary information. While the cosmological aspect per se does not detract from this conclusion, it obscures rather than clarifies.

Pericope Problems in the Mahakammavibhanga Sutta - Part 1

The second part of the excellent article, “Kamma in Context: The Mahakammavibhangasutta and the Culakammavibhangasutta”, comments on the philosophical imports of the Mahakammavibhangasutta.

The first part of the sutta begins the Buddha admonishing a monk for not properly answering a wandering ascetic who enquires into the different kinds of feelings one experiences for an intentional act of body, speech or mind:

This misguided man Samiddhi would have answered the wanderer rightly when asked about the three kinds of feelings 'Friend, Potaliputta, having done an intentional kamma by way of body, speech and mind [whose result is] to be felt as pleasant, one feels pleasure. Having done an intentional action by way of body, speech or mind [whose result is] to be felt as painful, one feels pain. Having done an intentional action by way of body, speech or mind [whose result is] to be felt as neither-pain-nor-pleasure, one feels neither-pain-nor-pleasure.'

This short and concise statement is revealing of the Buddha’s notion of kamma. For one thing, this statement indicates the importance the Buddha places on the psychological aspect of karma. Here he mentions how particular feelings result from certain intentional actions or kamma. It is important to note that there is no mention of future rebirths or any other metaphysical notions associated with cosmology.

Then an odd shift occurs and the Buddha starts his analysis of the “great exposition of action” by outlining four types of people who end up in heaven and hell: (1) Those who live unethical lives are born in hellish destinations (2) those who live unethical lives are reborn in heavenly destinations (3) those who live ethical lives are reborn in heavenly destinations (4) those who live ethical lives are reborn in hellish destinations.

He then goes on to relate how various religious men arrive at different ethical conclusions based on the perceived fate of people after death: (1) There are evil actions with negative results (2) There are no evil actions that have negative results (3) There are good actions that results in positive results (4) There are no good actions that result in positive results.

Interestingly, the Buddha mentions that one of the primary methods used to reach such conclusions is based on supernormal powers:

By means of ardor, endeavor, devotion, diligence and right attention, some recluse or brahmin attains such concentration of mind that, when his mind is concentrated, he sees with the divine eye, which is purified and surpasses the human, he sees . . .

What is interesting about this particular means of gaining knowledge is the primacy it is given in the text. While there does appear to be some evidence that there were other teachers in ancient India who did make various claims based on supra-normal insight, such insights are always associated with arguing for moral causality and never against it.

But this is exactly what we have:

By means of ardor . . . some recluse or brahmin . . . sees with the divine eye . . . sees that person here who abstains from killing living beings . . . after death, he reappears in the state of deprivation, in an unhappy destination, even in hell. He says thus: ‘Indeed, there are no good actions; there is no result of good conduct.’

The only religious school of the Buddha’s time who appeared to deny the result of moral conduct came from the Lokayata school. However, this school had a very materialistic view of the world and considered that the only valid means of knowledge was from the five senses. They would have probably denied the possibility of any such knowledge gained from the “divine eye.”

This red flag alerts us that this part of the text may not be original. Besides changing tone from a psychological one to a cosmological one, the definite scholastic systemization, that cannot be denied, all point to the fact of a possible later addition.

The article mentioned above does not even notice these difficulties and continues to take the sutta at face value which only makes author's main argument more difficult to make.

The main conclusion he comes to is based on the last series of passages in the text. In these passages the Buddha concludes that there is indeed moral causation and further elucidates the functioning of kamma:

As to the person here who kills living beings. . . and holds wrong view, and on the dissolution of the body, after death, reappears in a state of deprivation . . . even in hell: either earlier he did an evil action to be felt as painful, or later he did an evil action to be felt as painful, or at the time of death he acquired and undertook wrong view. . . . And since he here killed living beings . . . and held wrong view, he will experience the result of that either here and now, or in his next rebirth, or in some subsequent existence.

This passage is then repeated three times with the permutations of evil/good actions leading to heaven/hell.

The author then summarizes the meaning of this passage by noting, "This is the key message: do not be fooled by your own (limited) knowledge of events; do not let that undermine trust in the metaphysical principle, which is continually at work, although sometimes (perhaps often) not apparent."

In the basic outline of his conclusion, I agree with him. However, if he is referring to the “metaphysical principle” in terms of the cosmological kamma/rebirth passages then I disagree. In the next part, I will provide further evidence of rebirth interpolations and the show that the text makes the same important point in an even clearer fashion without them.

Revisiting the Culakammavibhanga Sutta -- Part 2

In the excellent article, “Kamma in Context: The Mahakammavibhangasuta and the Culakammavibhangasutta”, the author comments on the Culakammavibhanga sutta making some important points.

In the sutta, the Buddha replies to a Brahmin student who asks the Buddha the reason behind the differences in human beings in regards to length of life, health, beauty, wealth and so on. The Buddha replies by saying that it is a person’s ethical actions and not sacrificial actions which cause these differences.

As the author in the article states:

The cause of beauty, wealth, good health, a good and happy worldly life, according to the Buddha, is the moral quality of one’s individual behavior. And the antecedent of one’s moral behavior is the moral nature of one’s mind. This is the real point the Buddha is making.

While this goes a long way to help penetrate the meaning within the text, we are still left with some difficulties.

As remarked in part 1, the Culakammavibhanga Sutta is rife with repeated rebirth pericopes (on the dissolution of the body, after death, he appears in a happy/unhappy destination, even in a heavenly world/hell) which convey that long health, life, beauty and so on in are the result of actions leading to future rebirths. Instead of imparting a subtler and psychologically minded message that the author argues for, we are still left a metaphysical, categorical feeling about it.

These clashes of narrative tone suggest to me that there is something wrong with the text, which when examined, always seems to encounter difficulties when the rebirth periscopes are mentioned.

One example in the Culakammavibhanga Sutta is the passage where the Buddha mentions that long-life (a main concern of the Brahmins who saw long life as to lead to an immortal state) would be the result of not killing living creatures. Here the Buddha is subtlety criticizing the Brahmin performance of animal sacrifices; he is telling the young Brahmin student that by performing the sacrifice he is actually achieving the opposite effect of the intended goal.

Now with the rebirth pericope indicating that a short life will occur in the next life, the whole critique of the Vedic sacrifice no longer makes any sense. By saying that the result will only manifest itself in the next life does not deny that it works in this one. Granted, by killing lots of animals you may end up short lived in the next one, but within this current life you will be very long lived. With the rebirth pericope, it almost seems that the Buddha is agreeing with one aspect of the efficacy of the sacrifice. This is, of course, absurd as the Buddha always denied the efficacy of sacrificing creatures regardless if it whether it was in the present or in the future.

Another example of the rebirth stock passage causing difficulties is the Buddhas explanation for the differences in intelligence amongst human beings:

Here, student, some man or woman does not visit a recluse or a Brahmin and ask: ‘Venerable sir, what is wholesome? What is unwholesome? What is blameable? . . . But if instead he comes back to the human state, then wherever he is reborn he is stupid. . . .

Here, student, some man or woman visits a recluse or a Brahmin and asks: ‘Venerable sir, what is wholesome? What is unwholesome? What is blameable? . . . But if instead he comes back to the human state, then wherever he is reborn he is wise. . . .

If these categorical statements are taken seriously, it necessarily predicts that the vast majority of the coming world’s population will all be mentally impoverished because a good portion of them will not have the chance to meet a Brahman or holy man where they can ask the questions of what is wholesome or not wholesome.

If we remove the pericopes from both these examples, the passages in question start to make much better sense. In the case of the killing it would remove the problem of the effect of a short-life only working in the next life, and with respect with the example of intelligence it would allow for a more reasonable interpretation given its previous categorical nature would be excised. One such interpretation for the intelligence passage might be in seeing intelligence not just as having knowledge passed down by tradition but by actively seeking and questioning those around us.

Conclusion

The Culakammavibhangasutta sutta has been traditionally taught as explaining why people are born in a certain way. This simplistic interpretation does in no way take into account the overall context behind the text and does nothing to question the difficulties the stock passages present. By acknowledging the overall context and removing the stock passages, the text makes much more sense and truly reveals the genius of the Buddha.

Revisiting the Culakammavibhanga Sutta -- Part 1

In an excellent article in the Western Buddhist Review, “Kamma in Context: The Mahakammavibhangasuta and the Culakammavibhangasutta”, the author sheds new light on the Culakammavibhanga sutta by providing context to the text by taking into account the worldview of the Buddha’s interlocutor.

He justifies this approach by arguing that the, “Buddha’s discourses need to be read bearing in mind that he is responding to the world views and life-accounts of others.”

The first part of the article explicates the Buddha’s notion of kamma in relation to the Vedic traditions of the sacrifice, and begins to quote the Culakammavibhanga sutta where the Brahmin student named Subha asks the Buddha:

What is the cause, what is the reason that lowness and excellence are to be seen among human beings . . .those of short life span . . . long life span . . . those of many . . . and of those of few illnesses . . . those whose are ugly, those who are beautiful?

The author then states:

For a Brahman student to be asking the question of the Buddha is interesting, for, within the tradition of the Vedas . . . there are a variety of answers to these questions. The answers lie, in part, within the context of sacrificial rites. . . . Subha is asking about casualty, particulary about causes that bring about worldly benefits.

The author goes on to list such “worldly benefits” found in the Vedas as “life, health and prosperity” which closely matches the things Subha is asking about. From this it can be inferred that Subha is asking such questions as he is curious what the Buddha thinks causes these benefits, perhaps trying to find confirmation of the utility of the Vedic sacrifice or at the least gain another perspective.

It is important to emphasize here that Subha is not asking the Buddha about anything concerning the afterlife; he is asking the Buddha about things concerned with this life.

The Buddha first responds to Subha rather cryptically by saying:

Student, beings are owners of kammas, heirs of kammas, they have kammas as their progenitor, kammas as their kin, kammas as their homing-place. It is kammas that differentiate beings according to inferiority and superiority.

As the author points out, it almost appears that the Buddha is agreeing with Vedic tradition by saying that kamma or action is all important. For in the Vedic tradition, kamma or karma is the ritual action of the sacrifice that is believed to maintain the cosmos and influence the world.

The sutta continues with Subha asking for further clarification and the Buddha replying:

A person who kills living creatures . . . on the dissolution of the body, after death, he appears in an unhappy destination, in perdition, in hell. But if . . . he does not reappear in a state of deprivation . . . but instead comes back to the human status, then wherever he is reborn he tends to be short lived, while a person who refrains from killing living creatures . . . on the dissolution of the body, after death, he appears in a happy destination, even in a heavenly world. But if . . . he does not reappear in a happy destination . . . but instead comes back to the human status, then wherever he is reborn he tends to be long lived.

As the author points out:

As the Buddha goes on to explain in full, it becomes clear that he is using the term ‘kamma’ not in the sense of ritual activity but in a quite different way. . . he is redefining the causal basis of kamma by making a subtle shift in meaning from action to . . . an ethical dimension to the kamma process.

In other words, the Buddha is subtlety redefining kamma as not sacrificial action but ethical action.

This does indeed make perfect sense, yet there is still the issue as to why the cosmological stock passages of being reborn in hell and so on are present. Why would the Buddha be talking in such a categorical fashion about the results of actions in the next life when Subha is clearly asking about how results or differences are manifested in this one?

To me these rebirth pericopes or stock passages do not fit the overall context of the sutta and suggest to me that they are interpolations. I will argue my case in greater detail in part II, demonstrating that such passages were indeed most likely added and do nothing but obscure the more subtle and important message behind the text.